ABSTRACT Electronic medical records (EMRs) play an important role in healthcare networks. Since these records always contain considerable sensitive information regarding patients, privacy preservation for the EMR system is critical. Current schemes usually authorize a user to read one's EMR if and only if his/her role satisfies the defined access policy. However, these existing schemes allow an adversary to link patients' identities to their doctors. Therefore, classifications of patients' diseases are leaked without adversaries actually seeing patients' EMRs. To address this problem, we present two anonymous schemes. They not only achieve data confidentiality but also realize anonymity for individuals. The first scheme achieves moderate security, where adversaries choose attack targets before obtaining information from the EMR system. The second scheme achieves full security, where adversaries adaptively choose attack targets after interaction with the EMR system. We provide rigorous proof showing the security and anonymity of our schemes. In addition, we propose an approach in which EMR owners can search for their EMRs in an anonymous system. For a better user experience, we apply the online/offline approach to speed up data processing. Experimental results show that the time complexity for key generation and EMR encapsulation can be reduced to milliseconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, electronic medical records (EMRs) are very prominent in healthcare networks. They enables users to share their health data in a flexible and convenient way. For example, to find one's diagnostic report, a patient or his/her doctor needs only to retrieve the information from a database rather than having to search through numerous physical documents. Health data is very sensitive, and it is a major challenge to securely store and access EMRs in modern EMR systems. As most EMRs are outsourced to the cloud, they are easily exposed to potential threats and vulnerable to leakage, loss, and theft [1] . To prevent EMRs from unauthorized access, a standard solution is to perform an encryption before uploading them to the cloud.
Specifically, an EMR owner encrypts an EMR using a symmetric key, and only authorized medical staff are authorized to access and decrypt it. However, data sharing becomes inflexible in this case. Two potential issues are the complicated key management and repetitive encryption [2] : as patients usually do not know who is allowed to access their EMRs, they encrypt many pieces with distinct session keys and distribute the keys to different medical staff members.
The approach to accessing users' data needs to be flexible enough to address changes in users' roles [3] . Several schemes adopting attribute-based encryption (ABE) have been presented for fine-grained access control [4] , [5] . Users with attributes satisfying the access policy can decapsulate the EMR data. In addition, some advanced mechanisms, consisting of a multi-authority model in an outsourcing system [6] and a view-based access control [7] that allows patients to specify a list of authorized/unauthorized users, have recently been proposed. Role-based access control schemes (RBACs) [8] also allow fine-grained access control. They define a role-based policy for a hierarchical organization with identity-based broadcast encryption (HIBBE). While the above proposals achieve data confidentiality in the EMR system, privacy preservation for patients is still an unresolved issue. For example, an EMR of the patient ''Lucy'' is uploaded to the cloud, and no attacker can read the encrypted EMR. If the doctor is an expert in the hepatitis disease, an attacker can infer that Lucy may carry hepatitis B without decrypting her EMR. This means that an attacker can obtain her disease-related information by linking Lucy to her doctor, even without seeing the detailed EMR. This means that adversaries possess the capacity that no matter if the EMRs are encrypted or not, adversaries can deduce the EMR owners' diseases based on some experience, such as the acquired identity-related information. Therefore, if there is an anonymous scheme that obfuscates the identity of the patient during an examination, adversaries can only determine that ''someone'' carries hepatitis B without knowing who it is. Thus, the patient's privacy is preserved.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We design two anonymous schemes, denoted as ''RBACAnony'' and ''RBACAnony-F'', to preserve patients' privacy in an EMR system with role-based access control. We present competing models and a high level demonstration of rigorous proof. In brief, our schemes have the advantage of data confidentiality, identity anonymity and access control flexibility. Technical details are highlighted as follows. RBACAnony. This scheme is built on a bilinear group with two subgroups [9] , and a patient's identity information is hidden in one of the subgroups. The identity-related element in this subgroup is indistinguishable from a random element chosen from the bilinear group. Therefore, an attacker cannot distinguish a patient's identity from a random string. In addition, an attacker chooses the targeted identities he/she wishes to attack before the system is set up. This means that an attacker of the RBACAnony scheme cannot obtain any experience prior to attacking. RBACAnony-F. This scheme is built on a bilinear group with four subgroups [10] , and a patient's identity information is hidden in one of the composite-order subgroups. The identityrelated element in this subgroup cannot be distinguished from an element randomly chosen from the same subgroup. Therefore, an attacker cannot distinguish the patient's identity from a random string. In addition, an attacker adaptively gives out the targeted identities he/she wishes to attack after interacting with the EMR system. This means that an attacker of the RBACAnony-F scheme can accumulate experience before attacking and thus possesses a stronger ability to attack. Versatile access control. A user encapsulates the EMR using an on-demand access policy. This policy enables one-to-many encryption, where the EMR is encrypted once and different medical staff members are allowed to access it. Scalable data sharing. Senior medical staff members are allowed to delegate access privileges to their subordinates. Anonymous search. A patient and his doctors can link themselves to the targeted EMR, but outsiders cannot.
B. RELATED WORK
Access control [11] is widely adopted in the EMR system to protect patients' health data. Access control policies are specified by some pieces of legislation, i.e., health insurance portability and accountability act (HIPAA) [12] , electronic documents [13] , and company rules or regulations. The legislation regulates who can access and how they can operate the stored EMRs. Two solutions are usually used to support flexible access control. One solution is to use attributebased encryption [14] , [15] . As attributes can be applied to describe users' privileges, data owners determine the access policies. The other solution is to use role-based access control schemes [8] , where each user's identity denotes a role and one is allowed to gain access permission if his role belongs to a defined policy. However, there is still a lack of consideration regarding the identity privacy of EMR owners. Anonymization techniques can be used to guarantee users' identity privacy [16] . For example, some anonymous ABE schemes address not only data privacy but also identity privacy [17] , [18] . These schemes provide an analysis of confidentiality, anonymity and flexibility.
In practice, an unaddressed challenge to real-world deployment remains: healthcare organizations are usually structured hierarchically, with data being shared among many users. In a previous work, we achieved anonymous role-based access control in this kind of organization with a moderate security level, where an attacker must output the targeted identities before communication with the EMR system [19] . This scheme is denoted as RBACAnony in this paper. We additionally propose a new scheme in the current work, denoted as RBACAnony-F, where an attacker can adaptively output the targeted identities after interaction with the EMR system. Both schemes preserve patients' privacy in a healthcare network. The anonymous algorithms in [10] and [20] are used to achieve patient privacy for RBACAnony and RBACAnony-F, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
We introduce several notations to simplify the illustration of our scheme. For ease of description, we borrow notations from [8] , as summarized in Table 1 .
B. BILINEAR GROUPS
Let G be a group generation algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as its input and outputs the description of a bilinear group (N , G, G T , e). In the case where G outputs 
to denote the subgroup of order p i p j in G. These four subgroups additionally satisfy the orthogonality property, i.e., ∀h i ∈ G p i and h j ∈ G p j for i = j, e(h j , h j ) = 1.
Composite-order bilinear groups were first introduced in [9] and are widely used as tools for constructing cryptographic primitives [21] . 
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
We describe a typical healthcare network in Figure. 1. It mainly includes three entities: the trusted keying authority (TKA), the patient and the medical staff.
The TKA is trusted in the system and is responsible for generating and distributing system parameters, rooting master keys, and authorizing top-level medical staff and patients.
The patient is identified by his/her name or identity. The patient and his/her responsible medical staff are the EMR owners.
The top-level medical staff member delegates privileges to his subordinates, which forms a tree-like organization.
Each staff member is identified by a role vector consisting of ordered atom roles. For instance, the role vector for an intern doctor, consisting of ordered atom roles ''chief doctor, associate doctor, intern doctor'', is administrated by the associate doctor, whose atoms roles are ''chief doctor, associate doctor''. We assign the chief doctor, the associate doctor and the intern doctor to one access policy for a certain patient.
Each user can encapsulate the patient's EMR, but only the one whose role satisfies the defined access policy or the patient himself can decapsulate it. We hide all the identityrelated information in the system such that adversaries cannot infer patients' personal information. The adversaries include the dishonest internal staff and the malicious external attackers.
B. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In practice, all entities are likely to attack an EMR system. A dishonest party may try to obtain useful information from encrypted data that it is not authorized to access or to divert instructions from the system regarding benefits (e.g., with false information in medical disputes). Multiple dishonest parties may collude to achieve this goal. In the context of these attacks, the EMR system is expected to meet the following security requirements.
• Data Confidentiality. Personal data needs to be encrypted before being uploaded and securely stored on the cloud until an entitled recipient downloads and decrypts it. Specifically, only the users whose roles satisfy the associated access policy have the privilege to access the data, with all other unauthorized entities not able to obtain any useful information from the encrypted data, even if they collude with each other.
• Identity Anonymity. Identity-related information needs to be hidden, as individual privacy is vulnerable to loss, theft, and illegal transactions. When a user's identity is hidden in an EMR system, it decreases the possibility of an adversary guessing that user's identity such that hardly any third party can obtain useful patient information.
C. SECURITY MODELS
Our security models include the semantic security model, anonymity model and full anonymity model. The semantic security model is used to meet the requirement of data confidentiality, while the anonymity model and the full anonymity model are used to meet the requirement of identity anonymity. We define them according to the security games played between an adversary A and a challenger.
1) SEMANTIC SECURITY MODEL
We adopt the selective security notion [8] , i.e., an adversary must present the set of medical staff roles and the identity of the patient it wishes to attack before the system is set up. Init. The adversary A outputs a challenge access policy set P * and a challenge identity ID * .
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Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to obtain public key PK and gives it to the adversary A. Query Phase 1. The adversary A adaptively issues two kinds of queries:
• Upon receiving a secret key query for a medical staff member associated with a role − → R such that − → R / ∈ Pref (P ), the challenger generates a secret key for − → R and gives it to A.
• Upon receiving a secret key query for patients with an identity ID such that ID = ID , the challenger generates a secret key for ID and gives it to A.
Challenge. When the adversary A decides that it has obtained enough secret keys, it outputs two equal-length EMR files EMR 0 , EMR 1 that it wishes to challenge. The challenger picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encapsulates the EMR β under the challenge access policy set P * and the challenge identity ID * . It gives A the challenge ciphertext (Hdr, En), where En is the output of the encapsulation of EMR β . Query Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated adaptively. Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess β ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if β = β. We require that no polynomial time adversary can distinguish a ciphertext of a challenge EMR from a ciphertext of a random message with the challenge access policy set P * and the challenge patient's identity ID * .
2) ANONYMITY MODEL
The Init, Setup, and Query phases are the same as that in the semantic security model. Challenge. When an adversary A decides that it has obtained enough secret keys, it outputs two equal-length EMRs EMR 0 , EMR 1 regarding what it wishes to be challenged. The challenger picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}. If β = 0, it generates the header Hdr of the ciphertext under the challenge access policy set P * and the challenge identity ID * and encapsulates EMR 0 . If β = 1, it generates the header of the ciphertext under a random access policy set and a random patient's identity and encapsulates EMR 1 . It gives A the challenge ciphertext (Hdr, En), where En is the output of the encapsulation of EMR β . Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess β and wins the game if β = β.
We require that no polynomial time adversary can distinguish a ciphertext of the challenge EMR with the challenge access policy set P * and the challenge patient's identity ID * from a ciphertext of the challenge EMR with a random access policy set and a random patient's identity.
3) FULL SECURE ANONYMITY MODEL
In the full secure anonymity model, instead of committing the challenge access policy P * and the challenge identity ID * it wishes to attack before the system is set up, the adversary A can adaptively decide to output the challenge access policy set and identity during the system interaction. Clearly, this model achieves a stronger security level. Specifically, there is no Init phase in the full secure anonymity model. The adversary A outputs a challenge access policy set P * and a challenge patient's identity ID * that it wishes to attack after it issues sufficient key queries in the Query phase. The challenge access policy set P * and the challenge identity ID * should satisfy the following: for all the secret key queries for roles − → R and identity ID in Query Phase 1, − → R / ∈ Pref (P * ) and ID = ID .
IV. RBACANONY CONSTRUCTION A. OUR PROPOSAL
Our RBACAnony scheme is based on the HIBE scheme proposed by Boneh and Goh [22] and the RBAC scheme proposed by Liu et al. [8] and offers an efficient approach to supporting hierarchical access control. The property is motivated by Seo et al. [20] and is achieved by leveraging bilinear groups with composite order N = pq. Elements in the public parameters are utilized in two separate layers: ''key generation layer'' and ''anonymity layer''. Elements in the ''key generation layer'' are in the subgroup G p . They provide the secret key and master secret key functionality. Elements in the ''anonymity layer'' are hidden by the elements in the subgroup G q , which helps to ensure anonymity. In this way, we offer information regarding the subgroup G p in the ''key generation layer'' while maintaining our scheme's anonymity with the help of the ''anonymity layer''. Setup(λ, n). The setup algorithm is run by the TKA. We assume that patient identities and medical staff roles are elements in Z N . A secure symmetric encryption scheme with algorithms SymEnc(K , EMR) and SymDec(K , En) and a collision resistant hash H : {0, 1} * → Z N are employed in our scheme. The TKA picks a random exponent α [1,n] in G p , and [1,n] The public key PK includes the description of compositeorder bilinear groups (N , G, G T , e), and [1,n] and is kept by the TKA. KeyGenM(PK , MSK , − → R ). For any medical staff member associated with role
When a medical staff member wants to join the system, he should first be authenticated by the TKA. Next, if he is a top-level medical staff member, the TKA generates a secret key SK − → R for him. The TKA picks random exponents 
In the above equations, j ∈ [1, n]\I . Finally, the TKA outputs SK
The secret key for a low-level medical staff member associated with a role
is derived from a given secret key of his supervisor at a higherlevel SK 
Finally, the delegated secret key SK − → R r can be rewritten as
where j ∈ [1, n]\I and
In conclusion, by running KeyDelegM, the delegated secret key is well formed, appearing as if it was generated directly by the TKA using KeyGenM. KeyGenP(PK , MSK , ID). When a patient with identity ID wants to access his own EMR, the TKA first authorizes him and then assigns him a secret key. The TKA picks a random exponent r 1 , r 2 R ← Z N and outputs [1,n] EMREnc(PK , ID, P, EMR). For an access policy P, denote I = {i : R i ∈ S P }. When an EMR needs to be encapsulated under a patient's identity ID and an access policy P, the user (the patient or the medical staff member) first picks a random exponent s
Note that these random elements in G q can be chosen by raising g q to random exponents from Z N . Next, the user computes the header Hdr as follows:
Then, the user generates a session key K = E s and computes En = SymEnc(K , EMR). The encapsulated EMR is output as CT = (Hdr, En)
To retrieve the session key K , the medical staff member with a role satisfying VOLUME 6, 2018 the access policy P can use his secret key to compute
The medical staff decapsulation algorithm can correctly recover the EMR file with a valid secret key SK − → R , where − → R ∈ Pref (P) due to the following:
The patient with identity ID can decapsulate his own EMR using his secret key. We denote I = {i : R i ∈ S P }. The patient computes the session key
is a well-formed ciphertext. A patient can recover his EMR according to the following equations.
We showed that the RBACAnony scheme is selectively secure and anonymous in Sections III-C.1 and III-C.2, respectively. We now validate these characteristics via the following games between an adversary and a challenger.
• CT 1 of Game 1 :
where R p is randomly chosen from G T ,p , R and R En are uniformly distributed in G T , and R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 are uniformly distributed in G.
Proof: We develop the proof via contradiction. Assume that a PPT adversary can break the RBACAnony scheme. We then solve a series of difficult-to-solve mathematical assumptions: l-BDHE assumption, BSD assumption, l-cDH assumption and l-cDHE assumption [19] . Since no PPT algorithm can be used to solve these assumptions, we reach a contradiction and conclude that RBACAnony is secure. If the group generator algorithm G satisfies the BDHE assumption and the BSD assumption, then no PPT adversary can distinguish Game 1 and Game 3 . The ciphertext of Game 3 does not leak any information regarding the EMR data since the component corresponding to the EMR is a random group element. If G satisfies the cDH assumption and the cDHE assumption, then no PPT adversary can distinguish Game 3 and Game 5 . The ciphertext of Game 5 does not leak any information regarding the roles of medical staff members and the identity of the patient, as the components related to the roles and identity are random group elements. Concrete proof of this is given in our previous work [19] .
V. ACHIEVING FULL SECURE ANONYMITY A. OUR PROPOSAL
In this section, we show how to achieve full anonymity privilege control in RBACAnony-F. We apply the idea of an anonymous HIBE [10] to our RBAC. A user first chooses an access policy, which can be regarded as a broadcast group with all entitled identities. He only needs to encapsulate the EMR once and allows different medical staff members to decapsulate if their identities belong to this broadcast group. Note that the work in [23] also proposed an anonymous HIBBE scheme. The main difference lies in the fact that the patients are identified individually in our scheme, while they are allowed access to their own EMRs in [23] . Thus, we consider the patients' identities in addition to the access policy group when we design the broadcast encryption algorithm. Setup(λ, n). The TKA chooses a bilinear group G of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 . Then, it chooses random elements 4 , and α ∈ Z N and outputs the public key PK
and master secret key MSK = {X 1 , α}. KeyGenM(PK , MSK , − → R ). For any medical staff member with a role
When a top-level medical staff member wants to join the system, the TKA first authenticates him. It then chooses random elements r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N , R m,1 , R m,2 , {T m,j } j∈ [1,n] \I ∈ G p 3 for m ∈ {1, 2} and R P 1 , R P 2 ∈ G p 3 and outputs the secret key
− → R
r is used for re-randomization delegation. 
, his secret key is derived from a given secret key of his supervisor, who is at a higher-level associated with the role − → R . We denote
Given a secret key SK − → R , the high-level medical staff member picks random components r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N , R m,1 , R m,2 , { T m,j } j∈ [1,n] \I ∈ G p 3 for m ∈ {1, 2}, and R P 1 , R P 2 ∈ G p 3 and computes
where I = {i :
The delegated secret key can be finally attained in the form
The new secret key has the same distributions as if it was computed using KeyGenM with randomnessr 1 = r 1 + r 2 r 1 andr 2 = r 2 r 2 . KeyGenP(PK , MSK , ID). When a patient with identity ID wants to access his own EMR, the TKA authorizes him and randomly chooses r 1 ∈ Z N , R 1 , {T j } j∈ [1,n] ∈ G p 3 . The TKA then outputs [1,n] EMREnc(PK , ID, P, EMR). For an access policy P, denote I = {i : R i ∈ S P }. When an EMR file needs to be encapsulated under the access policy P and the patient's identity ID, the user randomly picks s ∈ Z N and Z , Z ∈ G p 4 and computes the header Hdr as follows:
Then, the user generates session key K = A s and computes En = SymEnc(K , EMR). Finally, the encapsulated EMR is output as CT = (Hdr, En) = (C 1 , C 2 , En). EMRDecM(PK , ID, (Hdr, En), SK − → R ). To retrieve session key K , the medical staff member with the role satisfying the access policy P can use his secret key to compute
Then, he runs EMR = SymDec(K , En) to recover the EMR.
Correctness. Assume that CT = ((C 1 , C 2 ), En) is a wellformed ciphertext. EMRDecM can correctly recover the EMR file using a valid secret key SK − → R , where − → R ∈ Pref (P) because
EMRDecP(PK , P, (Hdr, En), SK ID ). The patient with identity ID can decapsulate his EMR using his secret key. We denote I = {i : R i ∈ S P }. The patient computes a session key
Then, he runs EMR = SymDec(K , En) to recover the EMR. Correctness. Assuming that CT = ((C 1 , C 2 ), En) is a wellformed ciphertext, a patient can correctly recover his EMR using the following equalities:
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we provide a security analysis to demonstrate that RBACAnony-F is fully anonymous. We apply the dual system encryption technique introduced by Lewko and Waters [24] , which has been used as a powerful tool for security analysis. In the proof, ciphertexts (CTs) and secret keys (SKs) can take one of two indistinguishable forms: normal form and semi-functional form, with the correlation shown in Table 2 . Since the two kinds of ciphertexts and keys are indistinguishable, a simulator is able to replace the normal key and ciphertext with the semifunctional ones in security games. When both the ciphertext and key are semi-functional, an adversary can obtain no information regarding the challenge ciphertext since the given key is not able to decapsulate the challenge ciphertext. Semi-functional Ciphertext. The users run the EMREnc algorithm to construct a normal ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , En ). Then, they choose random exponents x, z c ∈ Z N and set 
Then, it chooses VOLUME 6, 2018 random exponents z, γ , z k , z P 1 , z P 2 ∈ Z N and {z m,j } j∈ [1,n] \I ∈ Z N for m ∈ {1, 2}. The semi-functional key can be set as
It can be seen that the EMRDecM algorithm will correctly output the EMR when decrypting a semi-functional ciphertext using a semi-functional key since the added elements in G p 2 can be cleared due to the orthogonality property. However, the blinding factor will be multiplied by an additional term [1,n] }. Then, it chooses random exponents γ , z k , { z j } j∈ [1,n] ∈ Z N . The semi-functional key can be set as [1,n] The EMRDecP algorithm will correctly output the EMR when decrypting a semi-functional ciphertext using a semifunctional key. The blinding factor will be multiplied by an additional term e(g 2 , g 2 ) γ x( z k + i∈I z i R i −z c ) . If z c = z k + i∈I z i R i , then decryption still works. In this case, we regard the key for the patient as nominally semi-functional.
We can verify the security and anonymity via a series of games. Game real : This game is a real game for RBACAnony-F, which describes the real interaction between the adversary and the EMR system. Game real : This game is the same as Game real except that all the secret key queries are answered by the secret key generation algorithm, not by the secret key delegation algorithm. Game restrict : This game is the same as Game real except that the adversary cannot query secret keys for the roles that are prefixes of the challenge role modulo p 2 . Namely, for any queried role
where P * is the challenge access policy, is not allowed. Game k : This game is identical to Game restrict except that the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary is semi-functional and the first k keys are semi-functional (0 ≤ k ≤ q). We note that in Game 0 , only the challenge ciphertext is semifunctional; in Game q , all secret keys and ciphertext are semifunctional. Game final : This game is identical to Game q except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encapsulation, with the component corresponding to the EMR being a random message in G T . Thus, the ciphertext is independent from the messages provided by the adversary.
Game final : This game is identical to Game final except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional, with the components related to the roles and identity being random group elements in the subgroup G p 1 p 2 p 4 . Thus, the ciphertext is independent from the roles and identity provided by the adversary.
Proof: In the appendix, we show that no polynomial time adversary can distinguish Game real and Game final . The ciphertext of Game final does not leak any information regarding the EMR file. The ciphertext of Game final does not leak any information regarding the roles of the medical staff and the identity of the patient. Thus, data confidentiality and identity anonymity are achieved.
VI. ANONYMOUS SEARCH
The EMR system may receive queries from the patient or the medical staff to search for someone's EMR. To respond to a search query, we set up an approach that links the EMR owners to their encapsulated EMR. We tag two labels, ID and P , with each ciphertext CT , forming (CT i , ID i , P i ). Assume that the total number of stored EMRs is m, i ∈ [1, m]. ID and P represent the hidden identity of the patient and the hidden roles of the medical staff, respectively, such that outsiders cannot identify them. Regarding the patient and medical staff, the following operations show how they can determine their EMR. SearchInitial. In this phase, we generate some parameters necessary for the subsequent searching work. Let G 0 be a bilinear group of prime order p and g be a generator of G 0 . For a generated ciphertext CT i , the ith patient with identity ID i randomly chooses an element x ID i ← G 0 , and the ith group of the medical staff in access policy P i randomly chooses an element x R i ← G 0 . Then, they compute a session key SK i : SK i ← g x ID i ·x R i mod n. n is a large prime number. The session key is owned only by the patient with identity ID i and his responsible medical staff in access policy P i . SearchLabelCreate. In this phase, we create the search labels: ID i and P i . ID i which can be obtained by applying a hash function to ID i : ID i ← H (ID i ). P i can be obtained by applying the symmetric encryption algorithm SymEnc with the session key SK i to the atom roles {R ij } in P i : {R ij ← SymEnc(R ij , SK i )}, j ∈ {j : R ij ∈ S P i }. {R ij } constitute the atom roles for P i . Then, the labels ID i and P i are tagged with CT i , yielding (CT i , ID i , P i ). Search. When a patient with identity ID tries to search for his EMR (or when one of his doctors tries to do this), he first hashes the identity ID and obtains H (ID). Then, he searches through the various ID i in all patients' labels and pinpoints the one whose value equals H (ID). When he obtains the index i, he uses his session key to decrypt the roles for the medical staff: {R ij ← SymDec(R ij , SK i )}. {R ij } are the atom roles in access policy P i . When the patient knows the access policy P i of a medical staff member and his identity, he can decapsulate CT i using the corresponding secret key.
VII. IMPROVING USER EXPERIENCE
To achieve the perfect user experience, we speed up the data processing in the key generation and EMR encapsulation procedures. We apply online/offline cryptography [25] to our scheme. The online/offline technique was initiated by Goldreich et al. [26] for signature schemes Wang et al. [27] extended the offline algorithm to the identity-based encryption system. Briefly, the online/offline technique splits the encryption or key generation process into two phases: the offline phase, in which most of the complex computations are first executed by assuming a set of random identities, and the online phase, in which only simple computations are performed to produce the ciphertext or secret key once the identities are available. In this way, we show how to move the computational work for key generation and EMR encapsulation offline. The following offline/online algorithms are based on the RBACAnony scheme, while the algorithm for the RBACAnony-F scheme is omitted due to it having similar procedures and results. Offline.KeyGenM(PK , MSK ). The offline KeyGenM algorithm takes as its input the public parameters and master key, excluding the medical staff role. We assume a random role − → R B with bound B on the maximum number of atom roles, which can be used to generate a secret key. Denote − → R B = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x B ) and I B = {i :
, where x i are randomly chosen from Z N and regarded as intermediate atom roles. The algorithm picks random exponents can be written in the following form: [1,n] can be pre-computed here. SK
has a form similar to that of SK
, but it is not used for EMR encapsulation. We can view the procedure as key generation for the intermediate role
. The work done in the offline phase is roughly equivalent to the work carried out for the regular KeyGenM algorithm. 
The subkey SK − → R r is output with a form similar to that of SK − → R d but without the elements {K i } i∈I . The dominant cost in the online phase is || − → R || multiplications for generating
Since the offline/online algorithm of key delegation follows the same procedure as that in the KeyGenM phase, we omit the details of that process. The dominant cost in the online key delegation procedure is only one multiplication. Offline.EMREnc(PK ). The offline EMREnc algorithm takes as its input only the public parameters. We assume a random access policy P B with bound B on the maximum number of atom roles, which can be used to generate a ciphertext. Denote 
The header generated in the offline phase is roughly equivalent to the work of the regular EMREnc algorithm. Online.EMREnc(Hdr IT , Id, P, EMR). The online EMREnc algorithm takes as its input the intermediate header Hdr IT from the offline EMREnc algorithm, a patient identity ID, an access policy P and the EMR. Denote I = {i : R i ∈ S P }, and note that I ⊆ I B since we have assumed the maximum bound B on the number of atom roles. The algorithm computes the ''correction factors'' C 4,i = s · (R i − z i ) and C 5 = s · (Id − y) for i ∈ I. Then, it outputs the ciphertext header
As the symmetric encryption time En = SymEnc(K , EMR) is relatively fast, the cost of EMR encapsulation can be ignored. The dominant cost in the online phase is (||P|| + 1) multiplications in Z N for generating {C 4,i = s · (R i − z i )} i∈I and
Finally, we should verify that the EMR can be correctly decapsulated after the online/offline algorithm is applied. The encapsulation key K is calculated using
K can be extracted as K = e(g, ω) s from the above expression. Finally, an EMR can be exactly recovered by running EMR = SymDec(K , En). 
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS Table 3 shows the efficiency of our proposed scheme in detail. The system parameters, the master secret key and the other secret keys (for the medical staff and patients) are linearly proportional to the maximum number of atom roles. The header contains only three group elements in G, achieving ciphertext with a constant size and being independent of the maximal depth of the hierarchy for the access policy set P .
In Table 3 , we denote t e as one exponent operation time in G, t m as one multiplication operation time in G and t p as one pairing operation time. In the procedures of KeyGenM, KeyDelegM, KeyGenP, and EMREnc, exponentiations can be pre-computed by choosing random exponents. Table 4 compares four schemes in terms of anonymity, order of the bilinear group and performance. We denote RBACAnony as ''Ours & Scheme-I'', RBACAnony-F as ''Ours & Scheme-II'', and our schemes with the user experience improvement as ''Ours & Improved''.
B. EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE
We conduct the experiment using an Intel Core i7 processor with 8 GB of RAM and a 2.6 GHZ CPU clock. We use an elliptic curve type A1 with the expression y 2 = x 3 + x for the Tate symmetric pairing. The group order of Z N is set to 512 bits, and the element size in G is also configured to 512 bits. The experiment is executed using the jPBC library (http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/index.html).
We test the operational time required for key generation, key delegation, EMR encapsulation and decapsulation for medical staff. We show the performance results in Figure. 2(a)-(e). Figure. 2(f) and Figure. 2(g) show the operational time after the user experience is improved.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose two anonymous RBAC schemes for the EMR system. We achieve flexible access control such that the EMR data can be encapsulated according to an ondemand access policy, with only users whose roles satisfy the access policy being able to decapsulate it. Patients' privacy is preserved using a bilinear group, where all the identityrelated information is hidden in a subgroup. Based on the chosen bilinear group assumptions, we prove that our proposed models have the property of semantic security and anonymity. We apply the ''online/ offline'' approach to achieve a better user experience.
APPENDIX PROOF OF SECURITY OF RBACAnony-F
The security proof is based on the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: Given group generator G, we define the following distribution:
Then, this assumption determines whether the given element
The advantage of an algorithm A that outputs β ∈ {0, 1} in breaking Assumption 1 is defined as
Definition I: G satisfies Assumption 1 if Adv1 A (λ) is negligible for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
Assumption 2: Given group generator G, we define the following distribution: g 1 , g 3 , g 4 , A 1 A 2 , B 2 B 3 ) Then, this assumption determines whether the given element
The advantage of an algorithm A that outputs β ∈ {0, 1} in breaking Assumption 2 is defined as
Definition II: G satisfies Assumption 2 if Adv2 A (λ) is negligible for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
Assumption 3: Given group generator G, we define the following distribution:
Then, this assumption determines whether the given element T ←e(g 1 , g 1 ) αs or T ←G T .
The advantage of an algorithm A that outputs β ∈ {0, 1} in breaking Assumption 3 is defined as
Definition III: G satisfies Assumption 3 if Adv3 A (λ) is negligible for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
Assumption 4: Given group generator G, we define the following distribution: [1,n] , a, b, c ∈ Z N and sets [1,n] , u P , A = e(Y 1 , Y 1 ) α ) to adversary A. B knows the master key MSK = (X 1 , α) and thus can answer all queries from A in the secret key query phase.
In the challenge phase, A sends B two equal-length EMRs EMR 0 , EMR 1 with a challenge access policy P * and a change identity ID * . B flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext [1,n] , u P , A = e(Y 1 , Y 1 ) α ) to adversary A. The master key MSK = (X 1 , α) is kept by B. Secret Key Query for Medical Staff. When A requests the l th secret key for the medical staff member with the role − → R l = (R l,1 , . . . , R l,d ), where I = {i : R l,i ∈ S− → R }, we need to consider three cases: l < k, l > k and l = k.
• When l < k, B creates a semi-functional secret key.
It selects random exponents r 1 , r 2 , f , z, w, w 1 , w 2 , w P 1 , w P 2 and {w m,j } j∈ [1,n] We consider B 2 as g s 2 for random s ← Z N . It can be seen that the generated secret key is semi-functional because γ = s · f , γ · z k = s · w and γ · z P m = s · w P m for m ∈ {1, 2}.
• When l > k, B creates a normal secret key by calling the KeyGenM algorithm.
• When l = k, B creates the kth secret key. B lets z k = i∈I a i R k,i + b, chooses random exponents r 2 , w 1 , w 2 , w P 1 , w P 2 ∈ Z N and {w m,j } ∈ Z N for j ∈ [1, n]\I ,m ∈ {1, 2}, and sets 3 with s, r 3 ∈ Z N . Hence, it is a semi-functional secret key with γ = s, z = r 2 , r 1 = r 1 , r 2 = r 1 r 2 . Secret Key Query for Patient. When A requests the l th secret key for the patient with identity ID l , we need to consider three cases: l < k, l > k and l = k.
It does this by selecting random exponents r 1 , w, w, {w j } j∈ [1,n] 
